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Preface 
 Richard Feynman famously declared, “I think I can safely say that nobody really 
understands quantum mechanics.”1  Sean Carroll lamented the persistence of this 
sentiment in a recent opinion piece entitled “Even Physicists Don’t Understand Quantum 
Mechanics: Worse, they don’t seem to want to understand it.”2  Quantum mechanics is 
arguably the greatest achievement of modern science and by and large we absolutely 
understand quantum theory.  Rather, the “understanding” to which these two statements 
evidently refer concerns the ontological status of theoretical constructs.3  For example, 
“Do quantum wave functions accurately depict physical reality?”  The quantum 
measurement problem represents a collection of such queries and the conundrums to 
which they lead.  Carroll offers two unsolved quantum riddles:  1) How is it that a 
quantum object exists as a superposition of different possibilities when we’re not looking 
at it and then snaps into just a single location when we do look at it? and 2) Is the 
quantum mechanical wave function a complete and comprehensive representation of the 
world or does it have no direct connection with reality at all?  According to Carroll, 
Until physicists definitively answer these questions, they can’t really 
be said to understand quantum mechanics thus Feynman’s lament.  
Which is bad, because quantum mechanics is the most fundamental  
theory we have, sitting squarely at the center of every serious attempt  
to formulate deep laws of nature. If nobody understands quantum  
mechanics, nobody understands the universe. 
																																																								⋇	sboughn@haverford.edu	1	The	1964	Messenger	Lectures	at	Cornell	University,	Lecture	#6.	2	NY	Times,	Sunday	Review,	Sept.	7,	2019	3	Unlike	Carroll,	l	doubt	that	Feynman	was	bothered	by	this	lack	of		“understanding”.		See	Section	3,		
Final	Remarks.	
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On the other hand, these questions have been pondered since the dawn of quantum 
mechanics nearly a century ago and if they haven’t been definitively answered by now, 
perhaps the source of the quandary is not with the answers but with the questions 
themselves.  Inarguably, during that time numerous physicists and even more 
philosophers endeavored to “understand” quantum mechanics in this way.  Some have 
claimed success; however, I doubt that many would agree. Most physicists are content 
with foregoing such metaphysical issues, falling back on Bohr's pragmatic Copenhagen 
interpretation, and then get on with the business of doing physics. 
I confess that during my student days, and even thereafter, I was mightily 
bothered by these quantum mysteries and enjoyed spending time and effort worrying 
about them.  Of course, as Carroll also laments, I avoided letting this avocation interfere 
with my regular physics research, otherwise, my academic career undoubtedly would 
have suffered.4  As I approached the twilight of my career (I’m now retired), I happily 
resumed my ambition to “understand quantum mechanics” and have ended up writing 
several papers on the subject.5  Furthermore, as others before me, I now proudly profess 
that I finally understand quantum mechanics J.  Even so, I’m somewhat chagrinned that 
my understanding is essentially the same as that expressed by Niels Bohr in the 1930s, 
minus some of Bohr’s more philosophical trappings.6  Some have criticized my epiphany 
with remarks to the effect that I am too dismissive of the wonderful mysteries of quantum 
mechanics by relegating its role to that of an algorithm for making predictions while at 
the same time too reverent of insights provided by classical mechanics.  I’ve come to 
believe that, quite to the contrary, those who still pursue an understanding of Carroll’s 
quantum riddles are burdened with a classical view of reality and fail to truly embrace the 
fundamental quantum aspects of nature.  In the remainder of this essay I’ll illustrate this 
point of view with four famous quantum conundrums and leave it to the reader to conjure 
more examples. 																																																								4	I’m	reminded	of	the	adage	on	the	wall	of	the	pool	room	in	my	undergraduate	dining	hall.	“To	play	a	good	game	of	billiards	is	the	mark	of	a	gentleman.		To	play	too	good	a	game	of	billiards	is	the	mark	of	an	ill-spent	youth.”	5	I’ll	spare	you	a	listing	and	will	reference	only	one,	my	overall	view	of	the	philosophical	foundations	of	physics.	(Boughn	2019)	6	Heisenberg	once	remarked,	in	all	due	reverence,	that	Bohr	was	“primarily	a	philosopher,	not	a	physicist”	(Pais	1991).			
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1.  The Copenhagen Interpretation 
 
 I’m sure that most of you are familiar with the “Copenhagen interpretation” of 
quantum mechanics and so I will not elaborate on its details.  However, I need to 
address some of the many misstatements attributed to it.7  My understanding of 
Bohr’s interpretation comes primarily from a 1972 paper by Henry P. Stapp8 and the 
reader is referred to that paper as well as another by Don Howard (2007) for an 
account of the mythology of the Copenhagen interpretation. Contrary to the claims of 
some, Bohr did not assert that quantum mechanics provides a complete description of 
an individual system but rather that (in Stapp’s words) “…quantum theory provides a 
complete account of atomic phenomena…”, that is, “…no theoretical construction 
can yield experimentally verifiable predictions about atomic phenomena that cannot 
be extracted from a quantum theoretical description.”  Neither did Bohr subscribe to 
the notion of the collapse of the wave function (that came from von Neumann and 
Dirac) nor did he believe in a privileged role for the observer.  Bohr did not maintain 
that classical mechanics was a necessary component of the foundations of quantum 
mechanics, on the contrary, he claimed that all experimental apparatus are, in 
principle, subject to the laws of quantum mechanics.  The quantum-classical divide to 
which he referred was simply the realization that the description of experiments must 
be in common language that can be comprehended by scientists and technicians alike. 
A point he made time and time again: it is the quantum of action that necessitates the 
probabilistic character of quantum mechanics. In fact, the statistical nature of 
quantum mechanics and the resulting conflicts with a classical notion of reality is in 
large part responsible for the quantum measurement problem and Carroll’s quantum 
riddles.  I’ll refrain from commenting further on Bohr’s interpretation except to the 
extent necessary in the following discussions of four quantum conundrums. 
 
 
 																																																								7	“The	Copenhagen	Interpretation”	was	not	a	label	approved	by	Bohr.		Heisenberg	introduced	it	in	1955.	8	In	fact	this	paper	(Stapp	1972),	which	I	read	as	a	graduate	student,	has	had	a	profound	effect	on	my	general	view	of	the	philosophical	foundations	of	physics.	(Boughn	2019)	
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2. Four Quantum Conundrums 
 
 The following four related questions are associated with the quantum 
measurement problem and all are of the sort for which Carroll insists we have definitive 
answers if we are ever “to formulate deep laws of nature”.  The first is the famous 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen “paradox”, which many consider resolved; however, it presents 
a clear-cut example of how it is that the burden of a classical view of reality can 
seemingly confound the understanding of quantum mechanics.  
 
2.1 The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox 
The 1935 paper by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) expressed those authors 
dissatisfaction with the then current formulation of quantum mechanics.  The conclusion 
was neither that quantum mechanics yields incorrect predictions nor that quantum 
mechanics is nonlocal, i.e., violates special relativity. Rather it was that quantum 
mechanics “…does not provide a complete description of the physical reality.”  The EPR 
manuscript was written in Einstein’s absence by Podolsky and Einstein was not happy 
with it.  He chose to couch his objection on the apparent action at a distance implied by 
quantum mechanics as will be discussed in the next section.  Nevertheless, Einstein did 
agree with the conclusion that quantum mechanics does not provide a complete 
description of a single system.9  The argument in EPR was a rather byzantine analysis 
involving a definition of elements of reality; however, in the end the conclusion was that 
both the position and the momentum of a particle were elements of physics reality.  The 
hidden assumption running through the paper is that a single quantum system, in this case 
a single particle, has a well-defined location and momentum at each instant of time 
whether or not these quantities are observed.  This is the essence of a classical world 
view.  Without that assumption, the argument collapses. 
A year later, Einstein (1936) offered a resolution to the EPR paradox, the 
ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics.  As Einstein described it:  
The Ψ function does not in any way describe a condition which  
could be that of a single system; it relates rather to many systems,  
to ‘an ensemble of systems’ in the sense of statistical mechanics…  																																																								9	I	agree	that	quantum	mechanics	does	not	provide	a	complete	description	of	the	physical	world	but	for	an	entirely	different	reason.	(See	Section	2.4	below.)	
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Such an interpretation eliminates also the [EPR] paradox recently  
demonstrated by myself and two collaborators…    
The ensemble interpretation, while minimalist, is considered by some to be the most 
reasonable interpretation of quantum mechanics (e.g., see Ballentine 1970). While 
Einstein admitted that “such an interpretation eliminates also the [EPR] paradox”, he 
added “To believe this is logically possible without contradiction; but, it is so very 
contrary to my scientific instinct that I cannot forego the search for a more complete 
conception”. In other words, he would still strongly suspect that quantum mechanics is 
incomplete. The ensemble interpretation seems to be immune to the EPR conclusion that 
quantum mechanics cannot provide a complete description of a single system by 
requiring that quantum mechanics only apply to ensembles of systems.  However, the 
specter of classical reality is still present for what does the ensemble represent if not a 
collection of single particles each with a definite position and momentum.  Ballentine’s 
presentation of the ensemble interpretation reinforces this notion.  If so, it’s hard to 
imagine how Einstein or Ballentine could accept quantum mechanics as a complete 
description of reality and thereby resolve the EPR paradox.10  
 
2.2 Bell’s Theorem, Entanglement, and Quantum Non-locality 
 Many credit the EPR paper with bringing the notion of entangled quantum states 
and action at a distance to the attention of the physics community; however, the major 
figures in physics at the time were already arguing about entanglement and Einstein had 
been bothered by action at a distance since the 1927 Solvay conference (Howard 2007).   
As I mentioned above, Einstein was not happy with the EPR paper.  In a letter to 
Schrodinger written a month after the appearance of EPR he wrote (Howard 2007), 
“…the little essay… has not come out as well as I really wanted; on the contrary, the 
main point was, so to speak, buried by the erudition.”  In that same letter Einstein chose 
to base his argument for incompleteness on what he termed the “separation principle” 
according to which the real state of affairs in one part of space cannot be affected 																																																								10	As	I	pointed	out	in	the	Introduction,	Bohr	did	not	assert	that	quantum	mechanics	provides	a	complete	description	of	an	individual	system;	however,	why	couldn’t	one	apply	a	statistical	interpretation	to	a	single	system.		For	example,	I	would	be	happy	to	place	a	bet	on	the	outcome	of	a	quantum	transition	in	a	single	system	if	the	odds	were	heavily	in	my	favor	(using	a	Bayesian	notion	of	probability).	
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instantaneously or superluminally by events in a distant part of space. Suppose AB is the 
joint state of two systems, A and B, that interact and subsequently move away from each 
other to different locations. (Schrödinger (1935) coined the term entangled to describe 
such a joint state.) In his letter to Schrödinger, Einstein explained (Howard 2007) 
After the collision, the real state of (AB) consists precisely of the real 
state A and the real state of B, which two states have nothing to do with 
one another. The real state of B thus cannot depend upon the kind of 
measurement I carry out on A [separation principle]. But then for the 
same state of B there are two (in general arbitrarily many) equally justified 
[wave functions] Ψ!, which contradicts the hypothesis of a one-to-one or 
complete description of the real states. 
His conclusion was again that quantum mechanics cannot provide a complete description 
of reality.  In this argument Einstein moves from the classical notion that the position and 
momentum of a particle are elements of physics reality to the presumption that the 
quantum wave function of a particle must be unique if it is to provide a complete 
description of the real physical state of the particle.  Quantum mechanics does not satisfy 
this requirement thus it cannot provide a complete description of the system.  This also 
involves a classical view of reality; it simply replaces the words “the position and 
momentum of a particle are elements of physical reality” with “quantum wave functions 
are elements of physical reality”. Quantum mechanics doesn’t allow this characterization. 
Einstein’s argument invokes action at a distance, “the real state of B thus cannot 
depend upon the kind of measurement I carry out on A”, which had bothered him since 
1927.  This brings us to John Bell’s 1964 paper, “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen 
Paradox”.  Bell was interested in “hidden variable” theories, classical theories with 
unknown parameters that could faithfully reproduce the predictions of quantum 
mechanics.  His conclusion was that the only way this could be accomplished was with 
superluminal interactions, the “spooky action at a distance” that vexed Einstein.  Bell 
chose a spin singlet system as an example of an entangled state.  In his notation, let 𝐴(𝑎, 𝜆) and 𝐵(𝑏, 𝜆) represent the results of the spin measurements of particles 1 and 2 in 
the 𝑎 and 𝑏 directions respectively. Bell’s condition of locality is that the correlation of 
any two measurements, 𝑃 𝑎, 𝑏 , be given by 𝑃 𝑎, 𝑏 = 𝑑𝜆 𝜌(𝜆)𝐴(𝑎, 𝜆)𝐵(𝑏, 𝜆) where λ 
represents the hidden variables with statistical distribution ρ(λ).  A moment’s thought 
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should convince one that the product of measurement outcomes in this expression 
precludes the types of correlations (quantum interference) that quantum mechanics 
demands and so it’s not surprising that the subsequent analysis of a sequence of such 
measurements is in conflict with the predictions of standard quantum mechanics.  The 
expression for 𝑃 𝑎, 𝑏  is clearly motivated by a classical view of reality, but to be fair the 
purpose of Bell’s paper was to investigate the possibility of a classical, hidden variable 
theory.  His conclusion was that any such theory could not be Lorentz invariant, i.e., it 
must be non-local.  However, in a subsequent paper (Bell 1975), he formalized this 
“notion of local causality” and, from the violation of a set of derived inequalities, 
concluded that not only is quantum mechanics nonlocal11 but also there exits a “gross 
nonlocality of nature”.  Again, here is a quantum riddle that rests wholly on the 
persistence of a classical view of reality. 
 
2.3 Wave Function Collapse and the Paradox of Schr𝑜dinger’s Cat 
 Recall Carroll’s first quantum riddle, How is it that a quantum object exists as a 
superposition of different possibilities when we’re not looking at it and then snaps into 
just a single location when we do look at it?  This snapping into a single location is an 
example of what’s referred to as collapse of the wave function and Carroll wants to know 
why this happens. There have been attempts to modify quantum mechanics so that such a 
collapse is a theoretical prediction; however, there are no experimental observations that 
suggest such a modification is necessary.  Standard quantum mechanics is self-consistent 
and its predictions are in agreement with all current observations. Then why even ask the 
question?  As far as I can tell, the only reason is a desire to attach a classical reality to the 
quantum wave function as did Einstein in his argument for the incompleteness of 
quantum mechanics.  If one forgoes this notion, there is absolutely no reason to pursue 
the matter further. 
 A related issue is the paradox of Schrodinger’s cat (Schrodinger 1935).  In 
Schrödinger's 1935 gedanken experiment, a cat is penned up in a chamber with a 
radioactive substance that is monitored by a Geiger counter. The half-life of the substance 																																																								11	I’ve	always	found	it	curious	that	the	fact	that	standard	quantum	mechanics	forbids	superluminal	signaling	hasn’t	disabused	those	who	assert	quantum	nonlocality	of	their	claims.	
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is such that after one hour there is a 50% chance that a single radioactive atom will have 
decayed in which case the counter discharges. If so, then a relay releases a hammer that 
shatters a flask of hydrocyanic acid and the cat dies. If the counter does not discharge, the 
flask is not broken and the cat lives. After one hour, the wave function of the entire 
system expresses this situation by having equal parts of an alive cat/undecayed atom and 
a dead cat/decayed atom and thus the “indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic 
domain becomes transformed into macroscopic indeterminacy" (Schrödinger 1935). 
When the box is opened and the cat plus atom system observed, the wave function 
collapses into one of these two states. This is absurd. Surely, the cat is either alive or dead 
before the box is opened even if we don't know which is the case. A way out of this 
conundrum is to claim that the wave function collapses as soon as the (macroscopic) 
Geiger counter clicks.  So perhaps the collapse mechanism does make sense after all.  On 
the other hand, the predictions of standard quantum mechanics are completely consistent 
with what we observe and until we have experimental evidence to the contrary, why 
purse the issue further.  The only reason I can think of is to satisfy our notion of classical 
reality. 
 
2.4 The Quantum-Classical Divide 
 As a final example, let’s consider the question of what constitutes an observation 
that supposedly causes the superposition of positions of a particle to “suddenly snap into 
just a single location.”  As Carroll puts it, “Why are observations special?  What counts 
as an ‘observation’, anyway?”  According to the Copenhagen interpretation, or so the 
standard argument goes, the act of measurement or observation must be described in 
terms of classical physics. Because classical physics is not (generally) couched in 
probabilistic terms, the classical measurement of a quantum system yields the specific 
result required by the probabilistic interpretation of the wave function.  While possibly 
resolving the measurement dilemma, this explanation immediately raises two related 
questions: 1) When and where does the classical measurement occur, i.e., where is the 
quantum-classical divide? and 2) How does one describe the physical interaction across 
this divide?  In posing these two questions, the specter of the notion of classical reality 
has again made its unwelcome appearance.  The conviction that every interaction 
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involves some physical process that is located at a specific time and place unquestionably 
arises from a classical view of reality.  
A related conundrum is why is it necessary to revert to classical physics in order 
to understand quantum mechanics.  Why didn’t Bohr seem to worry about the unseemly 
merger of classical and quantum formalisms?  I suspect the answer is because he didn’t 
actually consider that any such merger is required. While Bohr endeavored to be 
extremely careful in expressing his ideas, his prose is often obscure. However, consider 
his following brief description of a measurement (Bohr 1963, p. 3): 
The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the experimental 
arrangement and the recordings of observations must be given in plain  
language, suitably refined by the usual terminology. This is a simple  
logical demand, since by the word ‘experiment’ we can only mean a  
procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others what 
we have done and what we have learnt. 
Nowhere in this description does he refer to classical physics.  To be sure, Bohr often 
used the term “classical” in describing measurements but as Camilleri and Schlosshauer 
(2015) point out, “Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts is not primarily an interpretation 
of quantum mechanics…but rather is an attempt by Bohr to elaborate an epistemology of 
experiment.”  That the prescription for how to perform an experiment must be subsumed 
within the theoretical formalism of quantum mechanics follows only by analogy with 
classical physics.  Again, it seems that a classical worldview lurks behind this quantum 
conundrum.12 While I just characterized the requirement that experimental prescriptions 
be included in the theoretical formalism as emerging from a classical worldview; in fact, 
classical physics already fails to satisfy this criterion.  I’ve argued elsewhere (Boughn 
2019) that measurement prescriptions also lie wholly outside the formalism of classical 
mechanics.			 It is because the descriptions of measurements are wholly removed from the 
formalism of quantum mechanics that I agree with EPR’s conclusion that quantum 
																																																								12	Howard	(1994)	has	endeavored,	successfully	I	believe,	to	formalize	Bohr’s	notion	of		“classical”	descriptions	of	measuring	instruments	in	terms	of	density	matrices	and	thereby	insures	consistency	with	the	formalism	of	quantum	mechanics.		However,	from	my	pragmatic	experimentalist’s	point	of	view,	I’m	satisfied	with	Bohr’s	epistemology	of	experiment.	(Boughn		2019)	
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mechanics “does not provide a complete description of the physical reality”.13  Dyson 
(2002) made the incompleteness more explicit through four sensible gedanken 
experiments couched in the ordinary language of measurements and experimental physics 
that defy quantum mechanical explanation. Quantum mechanics quite simply cannot be 
applied to all conceivable situations. For Dyson, the dividing line between classical and 
quantum physics is the same as the dividing line between the past and the future.  The 
wave function constitutes a statistical prediction of future events. After the event occurs, 
the wave function doesn’t collapse rather it becomes irrelevant. The results of past 
observations, facts, are the domain of classical physics; the probabilities of future events, 
wave functions, are the domain of quantum physics.  Ergo, quantum mechanics does not 
provide a complete description of nature. 
 
3.  Final Remarks 
 
  I began my essay, as did Carroll, with Feynman’s declaration that “nobody really 
understands quantum mechanics”.  Carroll refers to it as “Feynman’s lament”; however, I 
seriously doubt that Feynman was bothered by Carroll’s quantum riddles.  Rather, I 
suspect that Feynman was simply referring to the wonderful mysteries of quantum 
mechanics and, perhaps, admonishing those who enter the house of quantum mechanics 
to leave their notions of classical reality at the door.  In fact, immediately following his 
Messenger Lecture “lament”, Feynman (1964) councils us 
So do not take the lecture too seriously, thinking that you really have to 
understand in terms of some model what I am going to describe, but just  
relax and enjoy it.  I am going to tell you what nature behaves like.  If you 
will simply admit that maybe she does behave like this, you will find her a 
delightful, entrancing thing. 
 The seemingly intractable riddles of quantum mechanics weren’t the first 
physicists have encountered.  The notion of luminiferous aether confounded physicists 
beginning in the 18th century.  In this case, the “classical” view of reality was that all 
waves, including light, require physical media in which wave disturbances propagate.  
After Maxwell, our notion of reality expanded to include dynamic electromagnetic fields 																																																								13	On	the	other	hand,	I	freely	admit	that	I’m	not	entirely	sure	what	it	means	for	any	theory	to	provide	a	complete	description	of	physical	reality.		(see	Boughn	2019)	
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and the notion of an aether medium was discarded.  A more recent example is provided 
by the nature of time in the context of the special theory of relativity.  In this case, the 
classical notion of absolute time leads to such unanswerable questions as whether or not 
two events occur simultaneously.  Ultimately, we had to abandon the notion of absolute 
time and accept a new reality as prescribed by relativity theory.  This latter conundrum 
was resolved much more timely, within a few years of Einstein’s seminal 1905 paper.  
The point is that new phenomena often require new points of view that end up changing 
our notions of reality.  Embracing these changes leads to a better understanding of the 
natural world.  So my advice to Carroll is, embrace the wonderful quantum world and the 
quantum reality it implies.  Do not try to shoehorn the quantum world into a classical 
reality. 
 Finally, I absolutely support the pursuit of deep understanding of our physical 
theories, a tried and true endeavor that has been crucial for our quest of understanding the 
physical world around us.  The appearance of new phenomena, the unification of 
theories, and even the pursuit of elegance and simplicity are all legitimate reasons for 
such an avocation and the successes have been spectacular: spin, superconductivity, 
neutrinos, anti-matter, black holes, gravitational waves, and many, many more.  The 
purpose of my essay is simply to point out that attempts to understand quantum 
mechanics by imposing a classical reality on what are essentially quantum phenomena 
inevitably leads one down a rabbit hole.  Why not “relax and enjoy it”? 
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